Fire Safety Curtain System Hand Crank Winch Questions

Smatticus

Active Member
A post by JR Clancy on Facebook about NFPA 80 and the requirement to keep a fire safety curtain in the closed position at all possible times has spurred much discussion. There have been some, in my opinion, unnecessarily heated and judgemental reactions regarding the, again in my opinion, unrealistic expectation that this be done if you have an unpowered hand crank winch system.

Please see this YouTube video for context. We timed the raising of our fire curtain by hand cranking using 3 operators taking turns. It took 12 minutes 25 seconds, which included a few brief pauses. The total average speed was 1.6 ft/min for a 20 foot proscenium opening.

Based on the above, and a review of ANSI 1.22-2016 Fire Safety Curtain Systems, I have some questions:
  1. Does ANSI 1.22-2016 not permit hand crank winches? It does not say this explicitly but it seems to be implied... It says an unpowered system is allowed for proscenium openings less than 925 square feet. It says that non-emergency operation must be possible with 1 person in 3 minutes. Based on real-world use, the expectation that 1 person can hand crank a curtain in 3 minutes seems pretty unreasonable. The expectation that this also be done nearly every day compounds the issue. Is the standard therefore implying that if a system is unpowered it must be, for example a 1:1 hand-line based system where 1 person can actually operate the curtain in under 3 minutes?
  2. How has NFPA 80 and ANSI 1.22 evolved on issues related to hand cranked systems over time? What are the grandfathering rules when it comes to compliance with the expectations concerning these issues?
  3. What are the compliance expectations related to hand crank systems and keeping the fire safety curtain closed as much as possible if your venue is not even required to have a fire safety curtain in the first place? (Per industry building and life safety codes) I'm assuming if your venue has a fire safety curtain which it is not required to have, then all aspects of the standards applying to it must be adhered to.
  4. Fire safety curtain systems with grandfathered asbestos curtains are still out there but this does not seem to be addressed in ANSI 1.22. I do not know if it is addressed in NFPA 80. Should it be recommended to keep an asbestos fire safety curtain in the closed position as much as possible when doing so puts it at much greater risk of being disturbed and thus creating an asbestos fiber hazard?
Let's keep the discussion of these questions civil please. For the most part I think we are all trying to do our best to keep our venues as safe as we possibly can. Based on what ANSI 1.22 says in Appendix note B.11.12., I don't personally believe we are putting our venues and occupants at some tremendous risk if we aren't keeping our fire safety curtains down as much as we possibly can. I am not advocating that people don't do that. If you are able to do it (because you don't have a hand crank winch system), definitely do it. @BillConnerFASTC I would be particularly interested to hear what you have to say regarding these questions and issues.
 
One further question related to NFPA 80 specifically (I haven't had a chance to review it yet)...

Many buildings have fire doors which are held open by electromagnets. In an emergency the magnet shuts off and the fire door closes. Why is a fire safety curtain, which is also an automated emergency fire control device, not treated similarly to such fire doors? When does NFPA say it's okay for a fire door to have an automated emergency trigger versus just needing to be kept closed basically at all times? Is the requirement to keep the fire safety curtain closed as much as possible a carry-over from ANSI 1.22 or is there some other reason why it is in NFPA 80?
 
Is the requirement to keep the fire safety curtain closed as much as possible a carry-over from ANSI 1.22 or is there some other reason why it is in NFPA 80?
I don't think it's a carry-over, as NFPA 101, 13.4.5.7.6.3. (G) predates ANSI 1.22 by ten years or more. Someone please correct me if I am wrong. See also the ten year-old poll: https://www.controlbooth.com/threads/poll-operation-of-fire-curtain.12159/ and https://www.controlbooth.com/threads/fire-curtain-code-question.12140 .
 
A few responses and thoughts, since I had a major hand in NFPA 80 - which preceded the ANSI E1.22 standard - and some hand in the ANSI standard. And all the language in NFPA 101 on this subject is largely mine. The requirement for closing during non-production times was added in 1988 edition of LSC- by yours truly. The justification: since the majority in existence did not work - this according to a large number of stage equipment contractors and a large number of consultants. Jay Glerum was one of the most vocal and adamant in reporting very few would actually close. Also, while there was little or no reports of a fire curtain having been effective in a real fire, it was seen as effective in preventing people from falling off the stage. In reported stage fires (NFPA's database) the only injuries were to fire service in 5 of 26 fires reported. 20%. (and property damage averaged less than $10,000)

Safety is not necessarily convenient or easy. In terms of hand winch, motorize it. Safety is also not necessarily inexpensive.

NFPA 80 (the law in many jurisdictions) requires straight lift curtains 850 sq ft and larger to be motorized. It requires all other than straight lift - including braille curtains -to be motorized regardless of size.

ANSI E 1.22 is not law - its a standard published by an industry association which follows the rules of ANSI in writing it.

Fire curtains are custom assembled on the job site assemblies and no where near as well tested and reliable as a door and closer.

Now, while I have worked a lot on making fire curtain regulations make sense, and not be a fireman a diesel electric locomotive just for the benefit of the contractors who make and install them, I have an opinion. They are archaic and the requirements for them should be deleted. There is virtually no record in the modern era of theatres - since the electric light bulb early in the last century - of fire curtains having played a role in life safety. A few anecdotal reports of property savings, but none fully vetted in my opinion. Since lighting has been a principal ignition source of theatre fires - especially while the theatre occupied - the advent of LED lighting is lessening that risk once again, just as the light bulb diminished it from open fla and open arc light sources.

Second indulgence - my opinion above being no.1 - NFPA awarded me their Special Achievement Award 10+ years ago for my work with NFPA on fire curtains. I rarely mention that but thought it might add some credibility. (Not that my skeptical, iconoclastic personality believes it should, but some will make the inference that it does.)
 
The justification: since the majority in existence did not work - this according to a large number of stage equipment contractors and a large number of consultants. Jay Glerum was one of the most vocal and adamant in reporting very few would actually close.

Were there requirements existing at the time regarding testing and inspection? It seems like this issue would spur more stringent testing and inspection requirements rather than necessarily the stipulation that curtains be closed every day.

Also, while there was little or no reports of a fire curtain having been effective in a real fire, it was seen as effective in preventing people from falling off the stage. In reported stage fires (NFPA's database) the only injuries were to fire service in 5 of 26 fires reported. 20%. (and property damage averaged less than $10,000)

Were all of those injuries due to people falling off the stage? That's understandable for venues where there is an immediate drop-off downstage of the proscenium, but how much help is it for stages with large aprons out in front of the proscenium? A removable railing system like those used for orchestra pits would more directly address the issue of a fall hazard at the front of the stage. I get it; if you have a fire curtain, why not let it double as a railing but man, that's really overkill for a railing.

Safety is not necessarily convenient or easy. In terms of hand winch, motorize it. Safety is also not necessarily inexpensive.

I completely agree. But there is also a tinge of hypocrisy in how we talk about fire curtains with regard to safety if it can also be said that there is virtually no record of them having played a role in life safety (your words). Given that, when other safety-related items are competing for money, ones that maybe do have a significant record of playing a role in life safety, it's not a surprise that upgrading a hand winch would not be a significant priority. Really, it's not a surprise that any other significant facility expense would be prioritized before the upgrading of a hand winch. The question is, why was the hand winch considered acceptable in the first place?

NFPA 80 (the law in many jurisdictions) requires straight lift curtains 850 sq ft and larger to be motorized. It requires all other than straight lift - including braille curtains -to be motorized regardless of size.

How long has this been the case? Does NFPA 80 have any specific requirements for the type of system if it is NOT motorized? What happens if a contractor ignores the requirements and installs a hand winch anyway? Also, if NFPA 80 is more stringent, shouldn't ANSI 1.22 be brought into compliance with NFPA 80?

...and not be a fireman a diesel electric locomotive just for the benefit of the contractors who make and install them...

I'm really not sure what you meant there... o_O

They are archaic and the requirements for them should be deleted. There is virtually no record in the modern era of theatres - since the electric light bulb early in the last century - of fire curtains having played a role in life safety.

Wow, so, that would undo a lot of work that you've done in the past. Thank you for your contributions in that regard, by the way. What forces are keeping the fire safety curtain a thing then? If the only acceptable alternative to a fire curtain is a deluge system it seems that would be a significant force for keeping curtains around right there.
 
@derekleffew Could you clarify how NFPA 101 and NFPA 80 are related to one another?
If i may, 101 is a code. 80 is a standard. Codes generally contain administrative provisions and scoping - what and how many are needed when and where. Standards are just that - if a sprinkler system or a fire curtain is required, how does it have to be built or how does it have to perform. Therefore, for 80 to ba law, it has to be referenced by a code. So 101 says when a fire curtain is required and 80 says how it is built, what materials, how it works.

Somewhere I wrote an article on this years ago. I'll see if i can find it. ...
PDF download here: https://www.controlbooth.com/resources/codes-vs-standards-optional-or-mandatory.8/ .
 
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Were there requirements existing at the time regarding testing and inspection? It seems like this issue would spur more stringent testing and inspection requirements rather than necessarily the stipulation that curtains be closed every day.

The issue is enforcement. Whereas AHJ's know exactly how to walk a building and look at last-tested dates on fire extinguishers and verify that nothing is obstructing the fire exits, most AHJ's have little understanding and awareness of fire curtains so when it comes to how the world actually works, there is no way to ensure that just because more stringent testing requirements are put in place that anyone will actually abide by them. This is the "human factor". Forcing people through general industry practice by your average stagehand to operate their curtains more frequently is one of the only ways to make somewhat certain they are ever exercised.

What forces are keeping the fire safety curtain a thing then? If the only acceptable alternative to a fire curtain is a deluge system it seems that would be a significant force for keeping curtains around right there.

Institutional momentum. I've polled some other theater consultants on this and there doesn't seem to be any consensus or distinct interest in pursuing a change to this regulation.

The introduction of LED's reduces the chance of a fixture catching a curtain on fire, but increases the amount of electronics in the air and the chance of an individual fixture sparking up on its own and the smoke that's generated by fixtures could be more toxic. Those of us who are pampered with fixtures by ETC and the like may scoff at that as a legitimate risk, but there are at least a couple videos out there of China LED fixtures igniting and requiring the show to be stopped.

Deluge systems aren't the only alternative. If you don't want your theater to get flooded when something inevitably fails with your deluge system or user error results in an accidental release, you can elect to use a smoke control system instead. The cost is generally prohibitive though for the average project. If you go with the prescriptive method under NFPA, you'll spend more on a higher capacity system than if you have someone design a system under the performance method. However, there are very few MEP consultants who can perform the required CFD (computational fluid dynamics) analysis for the performance method to minimize the amount of investment required in the smoke control system, and they'll charge for that service accordingly.
 
Smatticus - some responses.

There is a general requirement required systems be maintained. So, yes.

Yes, all were injured when they fell off the stage. Lees burdensome to require using something you have than requiring another system.

Yes, just what i posted. Straight lift under 850 sq ft. Manual counterweight is acceptable and covered.

I wouldn't say deleting the requirement would "undo" anything. I would like to think it would partially be as a result of my research and efforts. Things change. Technology changes. Attitudes change. Codes and standards have to change.

Related is some movement towards no longer requiring hose cabinets on stage. They were always for occupant fire fighting, not for the fire service. The idea that building occupants should do anything but get out is outdated. 101 has dropped the requirement. I need to work on IBC now. I mean really, does anyone expect the hs band director to fight a stage fire?

Anothet point on deleting the requirement. Besides fire curtains and deluge systems, you can use doors. I've done one or two with rolling metal fire doors. Comparable cost, always motorized. There are other listed devices. Horizontal coiling doors with motors and batteries. (Wan door is one). You can also use mechanical smoke protection, big exhaust fans in brief. So lots of choices. And the code permits you to design other ways to provide a 20 minute barrier between stage and auditorium. I've thought about a plywood wall coated with intumescent paint.

Therefore the code change would be to remove the requirement for proscenium opening protection, not the removal of the fire curtain option for thus requirement. Make sense?
 
To Mike's LED response, I think a 100 - 750 watt quartz fixtures represent a significantly greater hazard of ignition than the 50 120 watt LEDs that replaces them. No proof. Just a theory. I can put my hand on an LED after its been on for a long show. No way with the quartz unit.
 
@BillConnerFASTC,

I wholeheartedly agree. Those were concerns though raised by the crowd and one of the panel members when I brought this up as a question to a panel session on proscenium openings this last year at USITT. @KacyC was a member of that panel and may have valuable input to contribute to this topic, though she wasn't the one who had concerns about LED fixtures blowing smoke.

It seems at least for the moment that there is no visible champion pushing for elimination or reduction of proscenium opening requirements. I know in previous revision cycles moving the needle has required firms like Arup to contribute a massive amount of effort for fire/smoke propagation studies. Without anyone beating the drum on this and putting a study together to examine it in depth, I'm not sure we'll see any significant changes in the near future.
 
You never know. When you look at the changes that I have been a part of over last 30 years, it isn't as difficult as you suggest. And a lot of FPEs share my view to lack of value.
 
To Mike's LED response, I think a 100 - 750 watt quartz fixtures represent a significantly greater hazard of ignition than the 50 120 watt LEDs that replaces them. No proof. Just a theory. I can put my hand on an LED after its been on for a long show. No way with the quartz unit.

I couldn't disagree more. The odds of a standard quartz fixture catching on fire are minuscule. There is a slim chance that it could set something on fire while it's on, but as long as the staff is paying attention that shouldn't happen. And if it does it'll be while the building is occupied, and it should be able to be quickly taken care of. It's not something that will just spontaneously combust by itself. An LED fixture on the other hand has lots of electronic components in it, and a lot will be of questionable quality. Even reputable companies have bad runs. And with a lot of LED fixtures these days being left powered on 24/7 they could catch fire while the building is unoccupied and do incredible amounts of damage. We've all seen components in moving lights fail and at the very least let some smoke out. How many of us have seen a standard quartz fixture on fire or set something else on fire when it wasn't intentional? And then of course you have all the new battery powered LED fixtures that are packed full of Li-Ion batteries that have the potential to explode. How many of them are left plugged in all the time, constantly feeding those batteries a small trickle charge? Pretty much a surefire way to insure that at some point in time those batteries will fail. And I don't know that it will be caught like on a phone or laptop where the user can see the physical signs that a battery is expanding. I'm not sure they will be able to apply enough pressure to show signs of problems while sitting in a very rigid enclosure.
 
@techieman33 I believe that's the purpose of products going through the UL/etc listing process. If the industry concludes that DMX LED fixtures are somehow more dangerous than your average PC or desk lamp, it begs the question whether all architectural LED fixtures should also be treated with the same level of caution. Architectural lighting fixtures with 24/7 power connections and integral battery packs are already a very common product and are simply a side-step from exit signs and bug-eye lights that also have batteries built into them and have been that way for years.

China-grade movers and things and $35 generic fixtures with batteries that aren't engineered properly do exist, but I think you'd be hard pressed to use those as a benchmark for setting industry standards when many insurance providers and organizations have requirements for using listed products already.

In terms of risk factor, I would tend to think that in most circumstances any particular single fixture catching fire gives time for an orderly response or evacuation and in many circumstances won't be close enough to cause anything else to catch fire. With tungsten and Sharpy-like fixtures, the risk of catching a curtain on fire could be a much higher risk category because of the likelihood of swift flame and smoke propagation. The nature of ignition in this case means flame and smoke propagation could be much faster for this type of fire load. Unlike with LED fixtures, where in a fly tower you're not likely to have flammable goods directly above the fixture making your greatest risk dripping molten plastic so long as your fixtures aren't in direct contact with a soft good.
 
@techieman33 I believe that's the purpose of products going through the UL/etc listing process. If the industry concludes that DMX LED fixtures are somehow more dangerous than your average PC or desk lamp, it begs the question whether all architectural LED fixtures should also be treated with the same level of caution. Architectural lighting fixtures with 24/7 power connections and integral battery packs are already a very common product and are simply a side-step from exit signs and bug-eye lights that also have batteries built into them and have been that way for years.

China-grade movers and things and $35 generic fixtures with batteries that aren't engineered properly do exist, but I think you'd be hard pressed to use those as a benchmark for setting industry standards when many insurance providers and organizations have requirements for using listed products already.

In terms of risk factor, I would tend to think that in most circumstances any particular single fixture catching fire gives time for an orderly response or evacuation and in many circumstances won't be close enough to cause anything else to catch fire. With tungsten and Sharpy-like fixtures, the risk of catching a curtain on fire could be a much higher risk category because of the likelihood of swift flame and smoke propagation. The nature of ignition in this case means flame and smoke propagation could be much faster for this type of fire load. Unlike with LED fixtures, where in a fly tower you're not likely to have flammable goods directly above the fixture making your greatest risk dripping molten plastic so long as your fixtures aren't in direct contact with a soft good.

The chance of an LED fixture catching on fire is still extremely low, I'm just saying I think it's a much higher probability than a quartz fixture. As for the batteries. Sure there have been batteries in exit lights for decades, but they've always been lead acid, and to a lesser extent NiCD or NiMH. And I wouldn't be surprised if most exit lights still had them. Worst case with those is they might eventually leak. It could be ugly to look at, but it's probably not going to cause any serious damage. Li-Ion batteries on the other hand can do some serious damage. Even the "good ones." They have gotten better about designing them to vent "safely" especially the round cells like the 18650 or 21700's used in cars, flashlights, vape pens, etc. But the LiPo batteries in things like phones and thinner laptops still have problems, especially if they're constantly getting power.
 
I'm not suggesting the quartz fixture spontaneously combusts as some suggest an LED will, but the normal fixture operating fixture has been the ignition source of a number of small incipient fires. I've been on stage for at least three, and have researched others. I don't believe LEDs will ever ignite a curtain or drop like a quartz does.

It's interesting that a manufacturer is considering using the UL architectural listing for all their LED stage and studio fixtures instead if the stage and studio listing, which permits much higher temps.

Fewer circuits, much lower power, smaller feeders all lower the fire risk. Getting rid of hot light fixtures will make the biggest difference.
 
While I’ve never seen an incandescent fixture suddenly burst into flames, I have certainly seen gel smoke and melt before my eyes with a bad burner placement and electrical shorts that create sparks. The latter is my larger concern - electrical fires. Certainly less dangerous than the gas-burner days, but still a source of potential danger especially in older buildings. Our connections are regularly stressed by frequent connections, and what is the average maintenance on these?
The other “common” incandescent fixture-caused fire is the light by the curtain, which is a much lower risk with LEDs.

@MNicolai, I confess I don’t remember that specific part of the discussion, but I hazily recall discussion that LEDs don’t eliminate the electrical fire risk.

@BillConnerFASTC, is your argument that the fire curtain didn’t make a difference because closing off the proscenium altogether doesn’t matter, so therefore means to “preserve” a fire line at the proscenium are unnecessary, what ever they are? Does that mean that smoke vents (and sprinklers) would be required for all facilities, with perhaps smoke evac as an alternative when smoke vents can’t be accommodated?
Do we have data on fires in occupied theatres and smoke inhalation for the audience? Are statistics similar for Europe?

BTW, I believe that China requires a fire curtain *and* soaker system.

There have been changes to the fire curtain requirements even very recently (IIRC, fusible links is one example), so change is certainly possible when there’s evidence to support it.
 
Have to separate life safety - occupants - and property loss.

I can't find much at all of fires in occupied by an audience performing arts theatres, the type that might have a fire curtain, in this country. The three I've been in and several other contemporary (post WW II) I know we'll were unoccupied, or technicians. And the FC didn't close but ignore that.

I'm not sure FC were ever effective or warranted. Vents and sprinklers have been in my research. But the change from flames and arc sources, dramatic reduction in combustibles on stage, and the effectiveness of sprinklers have made them even less necessary.

And where are the bodies?

And what about the clear lack of many functioning for many decades. Not missed.

And would the ones we do in US really hold up? Looking at Frankfurt Opera house fire in 80s, seeing the metal man doors in proscenium destroyed by the negative pressure on stage, buckled inward.

As far as UK and Europe - they are not keen and perhaps a little afraid of fire sprinklers , so hard to compare.

And where are the bodies?

Irksome to me we pay so much attention to these and so little to the falls and cost of those hazards in the aisles and on stage.

I'm not sure my rambling really answered your question.
 

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